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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
No. 16237 
EMPIRE CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EMPIRE CREDIT, INC., 
Defendant, 
ED T. OLSEN and MARLENE SINE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Suit by holder of promissory note against corporate 
maker and its officers and stockholders on alter ego theory, 
and as trustees of the assets of that dissolved corporation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Snow granted judgment for repeated failure of the 
defendants to answer interrogatories, produce documents and 
to obey orders compelling discovery (R. 174 - Appendix "A"). 
Defendants were also in default for failure to answer plain-
tiff's complaint (R. 276) again. Defendants thereafter 
failed to comply with the discovery ordered by Judge Snow as 
-1-
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a condition precedent to vacating of the judgment, and 
failed to truthfully answer interrogatories when they fi-
nally partially responded, well after the time allowed by 
Judge Snow had expired. Judge Taylor denied (R. 418 - i 
Appendix "I") defendants' 60 (b) , URCP (R. 397 - Appendix 
"H"), motion to vacate Judge Snow's judgement and his order 
vacating that judgment if defendants complied with discovery 
(which defendants failed to do). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
An order affirming the denial by Judge Taylor of defen-
dants' 60(b), URCP, to vacate Judge Snow's judgment and his 
later order conditionally vacating that judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a suit by the holder of a promissory note (R. 
2). Plaintiff agrees with many of the statement of facts in 
defendants' brief, however, since much of that stateMent is 
argumentative and/or is incomplete or inaccurate counsel for 
plaintiff submits a separate statement of facts. 
Comments Concerning Defendants' Brief 
For example, on page 5 counsel states that the file 
does not disclose that notice of the hearing of June 5' 
1975, was given to counsel for defendant, however that 
notice is clearly included in the motion itself (R. 102• 
103). Counsel fails to observe on page 5 that the order of 
August 17, 1976, signed by Judge Snow (R. 166) was obtained 
-2-
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on an ex-party basis by Mr. Edmonds. The Order was signed 
by Judge Snow (after a delay of almost 11 r:ionths) immedi-
ately before hearing of plaintiff's motion to strike the 
minute entry upon which that order was based was to be heard 
before Judge Hanson (R. 155, 165), or that the answers were 
still not answered within the additional 15 day period 
allowed by that order. 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff's statement of facts is arranged according to 
major events as follows: 
(a) Circumstances leading to Judge Snow's Judgment: 
In November, 1972, (R. 44) and May, 1975, (R. 90) 
Plaintiff submitted interrogatories and requests for ad-
missions and for productio'(l of documents (R.44 & 90). 
Plaintiff's six motions to compel discovery and for sane-
tions (R. 49, 60, 102, 139, 155 and 167) over a period of 
almost four years resulted in two orders compelling dis-
covery under penalty of entry of judgment (R. 56, 58, 61, & 
89) partial answers to the first discovery (R. 62, and 
thereafter in four additional orders compelling discovery 
(R. 116, 141, 147, 166, 174, all of which was ignored by 
defendants; three of which were judgments against defendants 
ordered by Judge Harding (R. 116), Judge Croft (R. 141, 147) 
and after almost 4 years in the final judgment by Judge Snow 
(R. 174, 179). 
-3-
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(b) Defendants were in default for failure to answer: 
Defendants motion to dismiss filed in response to the 
sur:Jmons and complaint (R. 32) was denied in January, 1975, 
(R. 58). No answer to other pleadings had been filed by 
defendants in response to plaintiff's complaint at the time 
that Judge Snow entered jud_gl!lent against defendants. The 
defendants were approximately 1 2 /3 years in default at the 
time judgment was entered against them (R. 179). 
(c) Judgement sought to be set aside: 
It is Judge Snow's Judgment of October, 1976, that 
defendants seek to vacate. Notwithstanding repeated orders 
(R. 151, 166) defendants had made no attempt to respond to 
the discovery submitted in May, 1975, (R. 90) when Judge 
Snow granted the final judgment. No counter-affidavits were 
filed by defendants in opposition to the final motion for 
judgment and no objections to the discovery were submitted 
prior to hearing of that motion (R. 177, •26). 
(d) Judge Snow's Findings of Fact re defendants' con-
duct: 
Judge Snow made detailed findings of fact concerning 
the refusal of defendants to participate in discovery and to 
obey court orders conpelling discovery (R. 176- 178, 1[9 thru 
28) and granted judgment against defendants by reason 
thereof (R. 178-179). A copy of those Findings of Fact and 
-4-
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Conclusions of Law (R. 174 179) 
- are attached hereto as 
Appendix "A". 
It is recommended that the Court read said findings ,9 
thru 28 (R. 174 - Appendix "A"). 
(e) Defendants first object to interrogatories after 
hearing of motion to enter judgment: 
After hearing of plaintiff's last motion for judgment 
before Judge Snow (R. 170) Mr. Edmonds, defendants' counsel 
then, filed objections to plaintiff's second discovery 
(which had been submitted over 1/3 years before) (R. 171). 
(f) Allegations re illness of Mr. Edmonds and 
Mr. Olsen not made until judgment had been entered: 
After entry of the judgment Mr. Edmonds filed a motion 
to vacate the judgment (R. 187) supported by affidavits 
alleging that he had been ill for about 40 days (R. 183, 
216) referring to other separate lawsuits, and alleging that 
Olsen had been ill (R. 183, 203 and 216). A motion to 
strike those affidavits as insufficient was filed by plain-
tiff (R. 191) and a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of 
plaintiff (R. 195). Contrary to the representation by 
counsel for defendants (R. 187, ,2) Olsen was not suffering 
from a stroke, but according to his physician had suffered a 
prolonged severe illness "with a possible transient (short 
lived) ischemic (local anemia) attack." The physician's 
affidavit (R. 203) indicates that Mr. Olsen may have been 
-5-
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unable to prepare for or participate in a trial at that 
time, but says nothing about his ability to supply infor-
mation required to respond to interrogatories. 
(g) Plaintiff's affidavit disputes alleged illness of' 
Olsen: 
The affidavit filed by plaintiff to opposition. to the 
to vacate the judgment shows that during the period while 
Olsen was allegedly ill that he remarried, went on a honey-
moon, regularly drove his automobile to transact his busi-
ness and affairs, and appeared to the person making the 
affidavit to be fully competent and capable of handling his 
affairs and of responding to discovery (R. 196, •12). NoM 
of those items were alleged in oposition the motion for 
judgment in the hearing before Judge Snow where the judgment 
was granted. 
Judge Snow, and probably the later judges, considered 
the conflicting affidavits re alleged illness in exercising 
their discretion concerning motions to vacate Judge Snow's 
judgment. 
(h) New counsel for defendants appears before heari11& 
of motion to vacate judgment: 
Prior to hearing of that motion attorneys Joseph H. 
Bottum and Clyde C. Patterson entered their appearance as 
counsel for defendants (R. 215). 
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(i) New counsel successfully argues that prior counsel 
for defendants was grossly negligent: 
Mr. Bottum filed a memorandum (R. 269-270) in support 
of defendants' motion to vacate Judge Snow's judgment where-
in he successfully argued that Mr. Edmonds was guilty of 
"obbvious neglect and inattention to the matter", cited 
cases in support of the proposition that "neglect of coun-
sel in aggravated circumstances", "personal problems of 
counsel which caused him to grossly neglect the case of a 
diligent client and to mislead the client" was an "other 
reason" under Rule 60 (b), URCP, for vacating a judgment (R. 
269-270; 412-413). The record does not show that defen-
dants were "diligent" in this case. Mr. Bottum advised 
Judge Snow that Mr. Edmonds would not thereafter represent 
the defendants in this matter (R. 341, ~2), however, Mr. 
Edmonds continued to represent the defendants for another 1 
3/4 years (R. 393). 
(j) Judge Snow's order does not vacate the judgment 
unless conditions stated therein appear of record within 30 
days: 
"l. • • • shall be vacated and set aside at 
such time as it appears on the record 
that defendants have • . paid • · • 
attorney fees, •.• have fully answered 
interrogatories and requests for ad-
missions • . have produced the docur;ients 
-7-
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• and have fully complied with the 
terms of prior orders entered in this 
matter requiring the defendants to 
answer interrogatories and/or requests 
for admissions and to produce doc-
uments". (emphasis added) 
That order also provides (R.273, ,2): 
"In the event that defendants fail to fully 
comply with the conditions imposed 
under the terms of paragraph 111 above 
within 30 days, after entry of this 
order, then defendants' motion to va-
cate and set aside the jud8ment entered 
herein • • . is denie • " (Emphasis 
added) 
(k) Judge Snow later reaffirmed the order prepared 
by counsel for plaintiff (quoted above - R. 272 - Appendix 
"C" attached): 
Mr. Bottum also prepared and submitted an order to 
Judge Snow which was also signed (R. 274-275), however Mr. 
Bottum indicated by letter (R. 271) that he had no objection 
to the terms of the order prepared by counsel for plaintiff 
since "compliance with discovery is understood", difference 
between the orders being that his order omitted the require-
ments concerning compliance with discovery, Judge Snow 
struck the order submitted by Mr. Bottum and reaffirmed the 
order submitted by counsel for plaintiff which contained the 
language compelling compliance with discovery within 30 days 
recited above (R. 337-338). 
( 1) Defendants' answer contains no defense exc~ 
general denial: 
-8-
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Defendants finally filed an answer by a general denial 
in January 1977, (R. 276) and later amended that answer (R. 
331 ) , again as a general denial. Attached to plaintiff's 
complaint is a copy of the promissory note upon which the 
lawsuit is based (Following R. 17). Defendants have delayed 
enforcement of this lawsuit for almost seven years (R. 2), 
(m) Defendants' third-party complaint against the bank 
was dismissed in 1975: 
Valley Bank & Trust Company had been named as a third-
party defendant by defendants (R. 33-34) obtained an order 
of disr:Jissal in October, 1975, by reason of non-appearance 
of Mr. Edmonds (R. 154), filed motions and affidavits in an 
effort to have that judgment of dismissal vacated (R. 280-
291), however that motion was denied by reason of Mr. 
Edmond's failure to appear for the hearing February, 1977, 
(R. 334). 
(n) Defendants failed to comply with conditions im-
posed by Judge Snow and thereby forfeited the right to have 
the judgment vacated under Judge Snow's order (R. 272 -
Appendix "C") defendants were required to comply with said 
discovery by January 29, 1977. 
During January, 1977, defendants filed partial answers 
to the discovery submitted in May, 1975, (R. 301), and 
partially supplemented their answers to discovery submitted 
in November, 1972, (R. 292), however defendants filed objec-
tions to and did not answer certain interrogatories (as 
_q_ 
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Judge Snow had ordered - R. 272- Appendix "C" annexed) and 
failed to produce certain documents required to be produced 
under the terms of that order. 
Under date of July 20, 1977, defendants filed a notice 
that they would make tax returns available on July 27, 1979, 
but failed to do so within the time required by the order 
(R. 384, ,8, R. 309), and supplied a false sworn answer too 
said interrogatory #10, purporting to list all of the real 
property in which the defendant had a financial interest 
during the discovery period. See sub-paragraph (s) below. 
(o) Judge Snow's judgment having not been set aside 
plaintiff moved for an order vacating a stay order (entered 
by Judge Snow pending hearing on defendants' motion): 
Plaintiff then filed a motion (See also pages 10-11 of 
defendants brief) to vacate (R. 340) Judge Snow's order 
staying execution (R. 180, 345) which had been entered 
pending hearing of the motion to vacate the judgment, al-
leging that since the defendants had failed to comply with 
the conditions imposed by Judge Snow in his order within the 
time required by that order (R. 273-273 - Appendix "C") that 
the defendants' notion to vacate the judgnent was deemed 
denied as provided in Judge Snow's order, that judgment 
having not been vacated. 
(p) Judge Conder's order - July 18, 1977: 
Judge Conder conditionally denied that motion, (R. 355, 
356, 361, 366, 371, & 372) ordered the defendants to furnish 
-10-
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documents and to answer interrogatory 1110 of the May, 1975, 
interrogatories (R. 309, HO), by an order signed July 18, 
1977, (R. 356). 
Plaintiff's counsel believed that no order had been 
signed concerning the June 22, 1977, hearing and submitted 
another proposed order about November 3, 1977, (R. 371) 
which was si.gn.ed by Judge Conder November 27, 1977, (R. 
362). On December 8, 1977, plaintiff's counsel sent another 
copy of that order to Judge Conder indicating that the 
proposed order submitted about November 3, 1977, (R. 371) 
appeared to not be in the file. In the November 3, 1977, 
memo counsel had suggested that Judge Conder withhold 
signing that order for a few days to see if other counsel 
objected to the terms of th.e proposed order, and in the 
December 8, 1977, letter suggested that no objections to 
that order. Copies of that letter and order were sent to 
both Mr. Edmonds and Mr. Bottum (R. 371). They made no 
objection to that order. 
(q) Judge Conder's December 8, 1977, order did not 
change legal effect of prior orders concerning the same 
hearing: (R. 372 - Appendix "E"). 
Judge Conder apparently was not aware that he had 
signed the two prior orders concerning the June 22, 1977 • 
hearing and signed the third order Decenber 8, 1977 • but in 
doing so deleted the words "fully completely, truthfully and 
-11-
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accurately". A substanial part of defendants' argument is 
devoted to the change in said order (see defendants' brief 
pages 10-12). Again in that order Judge Conder granted the 
motion to strike the stay order if defendants failed to 
fully comply with the terms of the order (R. 373,,13). Said 
orders are set forth on pages 8-9 of defendants' brief. 
Deletion of those words had no legal effect upon Judge 
Conder' s order or the existing order of Judge Snow (R. 272, 
- Appendix "C"), as discussed more fully under the "argu-
ment" section of this brief. 
(r) Further discovery proved that defendants' answer 
answer to interrogatory #10 was false (R. 309, see also ~ 
(n) above): 
Requests for admissions submitted by plaintiff (R. 
375), which were not denied by defendants and are deemed 
admitted, (Rule 36(a), URCP) established that defendants had 
omitted eight (8) parcel of property from their answer to 
interrogatory #10 (R. 375). Defendants also failed to 
answer the interrogatores submitted with those request for 
admissions (R. 375). Those adnissions conclusively esta-
blished that the defendants has falsified their answer to 
interrogatory #10 (R. 309) (See also sub-paragraph (n) 
above). 
(s) Plaintiff filed a new motion to direct executiQ.E!: 
On August 15, 1978, plaintiffs filed a new motion to 
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direct the Clerk to issue execution, summarizing proceedings 
to that point (R. 382), and arguing the legal effect of the 
various orders. A copy of that motion is found in Appendix 
"E" - R. 382-386. C ounsel for plaintiff was not aware of 
the deletion of the words "fully, completely, truthfully and 
accurately" by Judge Conder from one of the three orders (R. 
272 - Appendix "C") signed by him. concerning the June 22, 
1977, hearing and accordingly did not so state in his motion 
(R. 382-385, 'J8). 
(t) Hearing of motion before Judge Taylor: 
That motion came on for hearing before Judge Taylor who 
granted Mr. Edmonds request to continue the case for one 
week "to give defendants an opportunity to employ new 
counsel" (R. 392). Mr. Edmonds appeared at the continued 
hearing without new counsel and was pernitted to withdraw at 
that hearing (R. 393 ) • At that hearing Mr. Edmonds indi-
cated that his services had been terminated by the defen-
dants (R. 393). Judge Taylor granted plaintiff's motion for 
execution and Mr. Edmonds motion to withdraw (R. 391), found 
that the conditons imposed by Judges Snow and Conder in 
their orders had not been met by the defendants, that the 
judgment had not been vacated by prior orders, and that 
under the terms of both of those orders defendants motion to 
vacate the judgment had been denied. Judge Taylor vacated 
the order of Judge Snow staying execution, and reaffirmed 
Judge Snow's judgment. (R. 393-394). 
--
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(u) Mr. Sessions appears for defendants and moves to 
vacate execution and judgment: 
Mr. Clark W. Sessions appeared as counsel for defen-
dants (R. 395) and moved under Rule 69(b), URCP, to set 
aside and vacate the order of September 13, 1978, (R. 392 -
order continuing motion from September 5, 1978, to September 
12, 1978), the judgment of October 19, 1976, (R. 179) and 
the execution asserting as grounds that plaintiff had 
proceeded with execution after Edmonds had withdrawn without 
serving a notice to appoint a new attorney (R. 397-399, 404-
406). That motion does not object to Judge Taylor pro-
ceeding to enter the order (R. 393) directing issuance of 
execution at the hearing where Mr. Edoonds withdrew (R. 397, 
404). 
(v) Judge Taylor granted motion in companion case and 
vacated $110,000.00 judgment against defendant Olsen in 
that hearing: 
At the time that Judge Taylor heard that moiotn filed 
by Mr. Sessions, he also heard a similar motion in case 
#207423 and vacated a $110,000.00 judgment against the 
defendant Olsen (the same Olsen as is defendant in this 
case), which judgment had been entered as a result of simi-
lar refusal by Olsen and the other defendants to respond to 
discovery and to obey orders compelling discovery. That 
matter was before this Court on a petition for intermediate 
-14-
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appeal as case No. 16237, which petition was denied. Judge 
Taylor exercised his di· screti· on b d · Y enying one motion to 
vacate a judgment and granting the other. 
(x) New counsel raises question of deletion by Judge 
Conder of said five words from his order for the first time 
on appeal: 
Mr. Sessions then withdrew (R. 415) and Mr. Roe now 
appears as counsel for defendants (R. 416). 
No argument was presented to Judge Taylor by Mr. 
Sessions concerning the deletion by Judge Conder of the five 
words from his order (R. 372-373 - Appendix "D"). Mr. Roe 
appeared in this matter in the stead of Mr. Sessions after 
that motion was heard by Judge Taylor (R. 416) who now seeks 
to raise the issue for the first time in connection with 
this appeal (Defendants' brief pages 8-12, 21-22, & 25) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN RE-
FUSING TO VACATE TWO YEAR OLD JUDGMENT AND LATER ORDER CON-
VACATING THAT JUDGMENT 
Entry of the judgment against defendants for continued 
and repeated disobedience of Court orders and refusal to 
participate in discovery, the imposition by Judge Snow of 
the requirement that the defendants comply with discovery, 
court orders compelling discovery as a condition precedent 
-15-
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to vacating of the judgment, the orders of Judge Conder 
imposing conditions and of Judge Taylor denying relief were 
all proper exercise of discretionary functions by the Co.urt 
which were adequtely supported by defendants' record and 
should be affirmed by this Court for the following reasons: 
1. Plaintiff's two sets of interrogatories were proper 
and plaintiff was lenient in extending time to permit defen-
dants to comply 
Counsel for defendants attempts to confuse the issues 
by criticizing plaintiff's efforts to compel defendants to 
comply with discovery by referring to those efforts as 
"procedure run amuck" (P. 12) and asserting that discovery 
was used for "harassment". Counsel for defendants also 
criticizes efforts by the Court and counsel for plaintiff 
for being indulgent toward defendants by repeatedly giving 
defendants additional chances to remedy their defaults and 
to respond to discovery as a part of orders imposing sanc-
tions by referring to those orders as "iffy judgments and 
others" (P. 12). 
2. Defendants failed to show that they have a meri-
torious defense to plaintiff's claim. 
Counsel for defendants asserts (without support in the 
record) that the defendants had a "meritorious defense" (P. 
12-25). The lawsuit is a simply action by the holder of a 
promissory note (R. 174 - Appendix "A"). No affirmative 
-16-
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defense was asserted by the defendants who filed a general 
denial (R. 276, 311 - Appendix "D"). This situation is 
similar to the case of Utah State Employee Credit Union v. 
Riding, 469 P.2d 1, 24 U.2d 211, where this Court held that 
where the defendant offered no proof other then denial in 
answer as grounds for vacating a summary judgment entered 
for plain tiff in a suit on a note, the motion to vacate the 
judgment was correctly denied. 
3. Defendant cannot assert matters on appeal which 
were not asserted in the lower Court: 
Defendants cannot properly assert in their appeal 
claims which were not asserted in the lower Court. Defen-
dants' assertion in their brief that they have a meritorious 
defense to plaintiff's claim is asserted for the first time 
on appeal (defendants' brief P. 12,25), but was not assert-
ed in the lower Court (R. 276, 311 - Appendix "D"). See 
also discussion under paragraph #2 above. Defendants asser-
tion in their brief (P. 25) that the Judge Taylor was not 
aware of the "character of the order entered by Judge 
Conder" was not raised or argued in the lower court and also 
cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal. Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. 
380 P.2d 135, 14 U.2d 169; Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 
396 P.2d 410, 16 U.2d 97. 
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4. Defendants were adequately represented by well 
qualified counsel at the time of hearing of the motion which 
resulted in the order from which the appeal is taken. 
At the time of the hearing before Judge Taylor which 
resulted in the order from which the appeal is taken (R. 418 
- Appendix "I") defendants were represented by Mr. Sessions. 
No claim is made by defendants that Mr. Sessions was not 
competent. All of the information with respect to the 
modified wording of Judge Condor's order was readily avail-
able in the court record prior to that hearing for examina-
tion by the Court and by Mr. Sessions. Even if defendants' 
claim of "misrepresentations to the court" (P. 24) were 
supported by the record (which it is not), the purported 
misconduct would be "intrinsic" (within the framework of the 
lawsuit) and accordingly would not entitle defendants to 
relief. The failure of a party to have used due diligence 
in presenting all of the facts to the Court or in failing to 
meet incorrect assertions (or even prejured testimony) will 
not be redressed in a direct attack on the judgMent. Wright 
v. W. E. Callahan Const. Co. 156 P.2d 710, 108 U. 28; 
Auerbach v. Samuels, 349 P.2d 1112, 10 U.2d 152. 
S. The judgment and orders were clear and unambiguo~: 
Counsel for defendants further attempts to confuse the 
issues by suggesting that it is uncertain from the record 
-18-
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whether the judgment was Judge Snow's original judgment in 
1976, (R. 179 - Appendix "B") or Judge Taylor's order 
ratifying and reaffirming that judgment (R. 394 - Appendix 
11 F11 ). I . f t is apparent rom Judge Snow's judgment that it is 
unconditional (R. 179 - Appendix 11 A11 ). Judge Snow's order 
of December 30, 1976, does not purport to vacate the judg-
ment but instead states that the judgment (R. 272 - Appendix 
"C11): 
11 
•• shall be vacated and set aside at such 
time as it appears on the record that the 
defendants have • • • 11 
The conditions imposed by that order were not met and the 
judgment was never set aside. The order of Judge Taylor 
simply denied defendants' motions to vacate and set aside 
said judgment and order of Judge Snow (R. 418 - Appendix 
"I"). 
6. Defendants' motion to vacate the judgment and 
orders were filed well after the time permitted under Rule 
69(b), URCP: 
Rule 60(b), URCP, reads in part as follows: 
11 
••• The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), 
(3), or (4), not more than three months 
after the "ud ment order or roceedin 
was entere or ta en. Emp asis added) 
Defendants' motion was filed December, 1978, (R. 397 - Ap-
pendix 11H11), and sought to vacate a judgment entered in 
October, 1976, (R. 179, Appendix 11 B11 ) over two years 
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before, and to vacate an order entered September 13, 1978. 
(R. 393 - Appendix "G") which construed orders of Judge Sno1; 
dated December, 1976, (R. 272 - Appendix "C"), and of Judge 
Conder dated July 1977, (R. 356), November 30, 1977, (R. 
361) and December, 1977, (R. 372 - Appendix "E"), all well 
beyond the time permitted under Rule 60 (b) , URCP (quoted 
above). 
Defendants' appeal is not from Judge Snow's judgment, 
or from his order which stated conditions under which that 
judgment could be vacated, but is from denial by Judge 
Taylor of defendants' second motion to vacate that judgment 
and order. A similar 60(b), URCP, motion filed by de fen· 
dants; prior attorney (R. 187) resulted in Judge Snow's 
December, 1976, order (R. 272 - Appendix "C") • Denial of 
relief was also justified by the fact that orders of Judge 
Snow, Judge Conder and Judge Taylor resulting for 60(b), 
URCP motions had not been appealed and were res judicata. 
7. Sub-divison (7) of Rule 60(b), TJRCP, cannot be 
used to avoid the three month limit on motions based on 
mistake or inadvertance: 
A client has a duty to contact his attorney and to ke~ 
himself advised as to his pending litigation. If defendants 
were not advised as to the status of their case it was t~U 
own mistake. Arikem Intermountain, Inc., v. Parker, 30 U. 2d 
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65, 513 P.2d 429. In Pitts v. McLanchlan, 567 P. 2d 171 
(Utahl977). the Supreme Court denied relief after the three 
month period provided by Rule 60 (b), URCP had expired, 
stating that reference to sub-section (7) of that rule could 
not be used to avoid the three month limit upon motions 
based on mistake or inadvertance. In that decision at page 
173 the Court stated: 
"We think the Chancellery may not be 
the appro priate place to seek redress 
for one's admitted 'mistake' or 'inad-
vertance, '". II 
In that case the Court also observed: 
"It seems inescapable, also, to conclude 
that Rule60(b) (1) is applicable herein 
the letter and spirit of rules governing 
procedure and prac.tice and the the doc-
trine of exercise of dili~ence in the 
presentation of one's rig ts, failing 
which they are amenable to a limita-
tions statutor feature lookin to re-
pose o iti~ation a ter a reasona e 
time inter icted here to be three 
months under Rule 60(b)(l). (Emphasis 
added). 
See also Parks v. Parks, 574 P.2d 588, 91 N.M. 369. 
8. After the three month limit imposed by Rule 60(0), 
URCP, had expired relief could not be obtained without a 
separate action. 
In Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704, the Court reaffirmed its 
P;lcher, 9 U.2d 222, 341 P.2d 949, to the positon in ~S~h~a~w:........:v~·:........:~~::..::..=-.:..:;..;._ 
effect that after the three month period had expired any 
-21-
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other attempts to vacate a judgment must be by an indepen-
dent action, not by a further motion as was attempted in 
this case. 
9. Defendants' 60(b), URCP, motion filed by Mr 
Sessions was properly denied since Judges Snow, Conder and 
Taylor had all ruled on similar motions: 
Defendants' motion by Mr. Sessions (after Mr. Edmonds 
had withdrawn), denial of which is the subject of this 
appeal, was filed in violation of 78-7-19, UCA, 1953, which 
provides in part as follows: 
"REPEATED APPLICATION FOR ORDERS FOR-
BIDDEN. If an application for an order, 
made to a judge or a court in which the 
action or proceeding is pending, is 
refused in whole or in part, or is 
granted conditionally, no subsequent 
applicant for the same order can be made 
to any other judge, except of a higher 
court; • • • " 
The conditional order of Judge Snow (R. 272 - Appendix "C"), 
the orders of Judge Conder (R. 356, 361, and 372 - Appendix 
"E") and Judge Taylor (R. 393 - Appendix "G") constitute 
prior orders within the meaning of that statute which pre-
cluded defendants from again filing a motion under Rule 
60 (b), URCP, for relief from said judgement. Defendants 
rights were limited to appealing to the Supreme Court if 
they were dissatisfied with the judgment, or any of the 
subsequent orders. No appeal was taken on said j udgr:1ent or 
orders. 
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10. The judgment and orders of Judge Snow, Conder and 
Taylor were all res judicata when defendants filed the 
motion which resulted in the order from which this appeal 
is taken: 
Under the doctrine of re:s judicata all matters are 
concluded by an order or judgment made when a party has once 
attempted to or should have attempted to obtain his relief. 
The matter should then be laid at rest and he should be 
denied a second or third attempt to obtain substantially the 
same objective under a different guise. Weadon v. Pearson, 
376 P.2d 946, 14 U.2d 45; Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 
P.2d 379; Warren Irr. Co. v. Brown, 498 P.2d 667, 28 U.2d 
103; Richards v. Hodson, 485 P. 2d 1044, 26 U.2d 113; 
National Finance Co. of Provo.v. Daley, 382 P.2d 405, 14 
U.2d 263. Defend an ts are limited to a single Rule 60 (b), 
URCP, motion. That motion was filed before Judge Snow in 
1976 (R. 187), apparently in lieu of an appeal. Later 
motions under Rule 60 (b), URCP, violate both 78-7-19, UCA, 
1953, (discussed in paragraph 119 above), and the principal 
of res judicata. Judge Conder's orders (R. 356, 361, 372 -
Appendix "E'') were also res judicata and Judge Taylor was 
bound by those orders since they also were not appealed. 
J h b h Or t he prior orders of udge Taylor had no c oice ut to on 
Judge Snow, Judge Conder and his own prior order in denying 
d . "I") ~r. Sessions ~otions (R. 418 - Appen ix • 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11. Cases cited by defendants in their brief support 
Judge Taylor's denial of defendants' 60(b), URCP motion: 
Counsel for defendants then discusses a few Utah cases 
which have under special circumstances permitted default 
judgments to be vacated after the three month period limited 
by Rule 60 (b), URCP had expired (P. 14-16) • Those cases 
are readily distinguishable from our fact situation and do 
little to support defendants' appeal for the following 
reasons: 
(a) Ney v. Harrison, 5 U2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956) 
(P. 14). That case involved an appeal from a 60 (b), URCP, 
order of the District Court vacating a 11 month old default 
judgment against a wife who believed that she was protected 
from liability as the result of a divorce decree which 
ordered her ex-husband to pay the real estate commission 
involved in that lawsuit. In that case the Court discussed 
with approval the rule established in Warren v. Dixon Ranch 
Co., 260 P.2d 741, 123 U. 416, to the effect that 
". • • this court on appeal wil 1 reverse 
the trial court only where an abuse of 
discretion is clearly shown." 
The Supreme Court went on in that decision to 
state: 
" • it is largely within the dis-
cretion of the trial court whether a 
default should be relieved, which 
discretion will not be disturbed unless 
there is a patent abuse thereof." 
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In our case, unlike the fact situation in Ney v. Harrison, 
supra, and in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. , Supra, the District 
Court has exercised its discretion by denying relief. A 
brief review of Judge Snow's Findings of Fact #9 thru 28 (R. 
176 Appendix "A"), and of the discussion herein under 
"Statenent of Facts" pages 2 thru 15 above shows that Judge 
Taylor did not abuse his discretion and was justified in 
his denial of those motions. Defendants have failed to 
"clearly" show a "patent abuse" of discretion by Judge 
Taylor. It is also important to keep in mind that the 
Ney v. Harrison, supra, and Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co, 
supra, case were simple default judgment situations for 
failure to answer, whereas the judgment in this case was 
entered after hearing at which defendants were represented 
by counsel, and the order of December, 1976, (R. 272 - Ap-
pendix "C") imposing conditions for vacating of that judg-
ment (which conditions were never met by defendants) was 
entered with the approval of defendants' attorney Mr. Bottum 
who consented to an order striking a conflicting order that 
had been presented to the Court by Mr. Bottum (R. 271-
2 73). 
(b) Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 U.2d. 156, 506 P.2d 
74 (1973) - (P. 15): In that case the Court and all counsel 
were under the impression that an order dismissing a case 
for failure to answer interrogatories had been a dismissal 
-25-
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-without prejudice, whereas it was in fact a dismissal with 
prejudice, a fact which was not learned by the client until 
new counsel was employed after his former attorney had peen 
suspended. The Court held that the lower court had not 
abused its discretion by correcting the order under Rule 
69(b) (7), URCP, more than a year after the judgment had been 
entered. The Court could well have made that correction 
under Rule 60 (a), URCP, which privided that clerical errors 
can be corrected at any time. In that case similar inter-
rogatories had been answered in a companion case which had 
thereafter been consolidated so that the answers were in 
fact available in the file. The Supreme Court again a-
ffirmed the lower Court and found that the Court's dis-
cretion had not been abused. Applying that rule to the 
facts in our case shows that this Court should affirm the 
denial by Judge Taylor of the motion to vacate the judgment 
and order. 
(c) Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 
1964) and King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474 (D.C.R.I. 1969) 
(P. 16-17 of defendants' brief: 
Theses cases deal with situations where a where a 
"diligent" client was relieved of a dismissal (Steuart v. 
Matthew, supra) and of a judgment (King v. Mordowan~, 
supra) because of "inexcusable neglect" by their attorney 
who had personal problems. Those cases are interesting 
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but do little to assist defendants under our fact situation. 
There is nothing in the record to show that defendants were 
"diligent". Among other things defendants failed to submit 
to a deposition noticed by plaintiff (R. 57), to answer 
interrogatories and to produce documents notwithstanding 
repeated demands and motions. Those defaults continued even 
after judgment had been entered on two prior occaisions for 
failure to respond to discovery (R. 116 and 141) and after 
the judgment was finally entered by Judge Snow and would 
have been set aside per Judge Snow's order of December, 
1976, (R. 272 - Appendix "C") had defendants simply com-
plied with the terms of that order by participating in 
discovery. While affidavits were filed asserting that Mr. 
Olsen was ill (See discussion P. 5 and 6 above) no affi-
davits or other explanation were given to excuse failure of 
Mrs. Sine to respond to discovery. Both Olsen and Sine 
personally signed answers to interrogatories in January, 
1977, which by their terms showed that they had been out-
standing since 1972 (R. 292) and answer to interrogatories 
which had been outstanding since 1975, (R. 301-313) • Later 
discovery (R. 363, 375) established that their answer to 
interrogatory #10 was false. Under Rule 37(a)(e), URCP, an 
incomplete answer is treated as failure to answer. Both 
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defendants wholly failed to answer the interrogtories and 
requests for admissions subr;iitted in May, 1978, (R. 363 
375). The defendants willfully and deliberately fai~ed and 
refused to participate in discovery and to obey court 
orders. See discussion under "Stater;ient of Facts" above. 
12. Discretion exercised by Judge Taylor is supported 
by the record of defendants' willful failure to comply with 
discovery, court orders, and aggravated circumstances and 
was not an abuse of discretion: 
In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Numley, 17 U.2d 97, 396 P. 2d 
410, the Supremem Court affirmed a j udgrnent awarded for 
failure to comply with a pretrial discovery order requireing 
production of documents, a situtation very similar to our 
case, holding that the district court had not abused its 
discretion. In that decision the Court stated several rules 
which are applicable to our fact situaton and appear to be 
dispositive of defendants' appeal, as follows: 
"Whether the failure to complt with the 
court's order has been wi ltul and 
whether the circumstances are so aggra-
vated as to justify the action taken is 
rimaril for the trial court to deter-
mine. Ci ting Ras ury v. Bainun, U. 
2d 239) Unless it is shown that his 
action is without support in the record, 
or is a plain abuse of discretion, it 
should not be disturbed. There is 
nothing to suggest that such was the 
situation here. But on the contrary, 
there are several consideratons which 
support the trial court's action. 
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We first note the basic premise on 
appeal: That the judgment is presumed 
to be correct and that the burden of es-
tablishing its invalidity is upon the 
party attacking it." (Emphasis added) 
Judge Snow's judgment was supported by detailed findings of 
fact concerning the refusal of defendants to obey court 
orders and to participate in discovery (R. 175, ,9-28 - Ap-
pendix "A"). The other orders are all founded upon just 
cause as discussed above. The order of Judge Taylor from 
which the appeal is taken (R. 418 - Appendix "I") is justi-
fied in view of the record in this case, was not an abuse 
of discretion and should not be disturbed by this court. In 
Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 U.2d 62, 387 P.2d 239, the Supreme 
Court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for fail-
ure to produce records as ordered. In Rio Grande Gas Co. 
v. Gilvert 491 P.2d 162, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
affirmed dismissal of a case for failure to produce docu-
ments within the times required by the Court's order, find-
ing that efforts by the defendants were not good faith 
efforts to comply with the Court's order. That Court dis-
cusses approval at Page 164 this Court's holding in 
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Numley 16 U.2d 97, 306 P.2d 410, 412, 
and also reaffirmed the Utah Court's opinion that the decision 
of the trial court would not be disturbed unless it is 
· h h d s a plain abuse of wit out support in t e recor , or wa 
-29-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13. United States Supreme Court has held that issue on 
appeal is not whether the appellant court would have granted 
as an original matter, but whether lower court abused its 
discretion: 
In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 
Inc., 1976, 96 S. Ct., 2778, 2780, 427 U.S. 637, 649-643, 49 
L. Ed2d 474, the trial court had ordered disnissal for what 
it found to be flagrant bad faith on the part of plaintiff 
in failing to answer interrogatories. The court of appeals 
felt that the sanction was too severe, particularly since it 
believed that plaintiff would comply with the discovery 
rules in the future, and it reversed. The Supreme Court, in 
turn, reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the 
district court's order of dismissal. In doing so the Supreme 
Court stated: 
"The question, of course, is not whether 
the Court of Appeals, would as an ori-
ginal matter have dismissed the action; 
it is whether the District Court abused 
its discretion in so doing" 
The reversal by the Supreme Court came because the Supreme 
Court found that the Court of appeals was in error in find-
ing an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The Court in 
that case also observed: 
"But here, as in other areas of the 
law, the mot servere in the spectrum of 
sanctions must be available to the 
district court in appropriate cases, not 
merely to penalize those whose conduct 
may be deened to warrant such a sanc-
tion, but to deter those who might be 
tempted to such conduct in the absence 
of such a deterrent." 
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In Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & Co., C.A. 10th, 1978, 570 F.2d 
1370, the Court of Appeals held that ultimate and reluctant 
production of documents over more than a year after legi-
timate requests would not absolve plaintiff of a charge that 
it willfully failed to obey a valid court order. See also 
Denton v. Mr. Swiss of Missouri, CA 8th, 1977, 564 F.2d 236; 
General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb MFG. Co., C.A. 8th, 1973, 
481 F.2d 1204; G.K. Property & Revevelopment Agencey of 
City of San Jose, C.A. 9th, 1978, 577 F.2d 645; 
Chrysler Cor., D.C. Del. 1975, 70 F.R.D. 35. 
Plant v. 
14. Defendants are charged with acts of their attorney 
where they elected to continue to use his services after 
had obtained relief from Judge Snow based upon alleged mis 
conduct of that attorney: 
Mr. Bottum appeared for defendants in 1976 (R. 215) and 
successfully argued to Judge Snow that defendants should not 
be penalized for the misconduct and neglect of Mr. Edmonds 
(R. 269). When defendants elected to continue with the 
services of Mr. Edmonds after they had been required to 
employ Mr. Bottom to try to salvage them from the prior 
neglect of Mr. Edmonds, they cannot two years later again be 
heard to make the same excuse (defendants brief P. 17-25) • 
They selected their attorney and a rebound by his acts and 
omissions. tlotice to an attorney is notice to his client 
Alexander v. Russo, 571 P2d 229, see also Wests Pacific 
Digest Key # 104 and cases then cited. 
_ ".l l -
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Counsel for defendants then discusses in generalitites 
(P. 17-23) the various motions, orders and proceedings which 
occurred in an unsuccessful effort to compel defendants to 
answer the two sets of interrogatories submitted/ by plain-
tiff (R. 44,90), apparently in an effort to somehow blme 
plaintiff for defendants' refusal to permit discovery, 
refusal to obey court orders, and for the many appearances 
made by plaintiff's attorney in an effort to obtain dis-
covery. 
15. Defendants cannot now object to interrogatories on 
appeal when they failed to answer, object or move for pro-
tective order. 
Counsel for defendant criticizes the many indulgences 
granted to counsel for defendants by repeated continuances 
(P. 18-19), refraining from imposing more severe sanctions 
at an earlier date and for refraining from entering judgment 
after it had been ordered by the Court (R. 116). Counsel 
for defendants also criticizes the content of the inter-
rogatories submitted by plaintiffs, asserting that they were 
designed to harass instead of to discover (P. 19), however 
no objections were filed within the time provided by Rule 
33 (a), URCP, and no motion for a protective order was filed 
objections to discovery only after the motion for j udgrnent 
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as provided by Rule 26(c), URCP. Defendants filed ob-
jections to discovery only after the motion for judgment had 
been argued (R. 171) but before Judge Snow had granted 
judgment (R. 174). Rule 33(a), URCP, requires that answers 
to be filed within the time required as to all interroga-
tories to which no objection is filed. Defendants elected 
to not object or answer and made no objection to the content 
of the interrogatories in opposition to the various motions 
to compel and resulting orders compelling (discussed above). 
If the defendants had a genuine problem concerning the scope 
of a particular question the matter should have been discussed 
with counsel, for plaintiff, and if it could not be resolved 
between counsel, then should have then brought the matter 
before the Court on an objection or motion for protective 
order. Defendants are too late to now object to the content 
of interrogatories submitted in 1972 and 1975, in an effort 
to vacate a 1976 judgment. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to 
vacate a two year old judgment and to vacate a later order 
concerning that judgment (which order construed earlier 
orders of the same and two other judges) should not be 
disturbed on appeal since the manner in which the discretion 
was exercised is supported by the record and does not con-
stitute an abuse of discretion. 
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In support of his judgment Judge Snow made detailed 
findings of fact concerning the refusal of defendants to 
participate in discovery and their disobedience of court 
orders compelling discovery (Appendix "A", ~[9 ,' thru 28). 
Judge Snow ordered that the judgment might thereafter be 
vacated if the record were made to show compliance with 
conditions which he imposed (including compliance with prior 
orders compelling discovery - Appendix "C") Judge Conder 
gave the defendant a further chance to comply with discovery 
(Appendix E") • Judge Taylor found that defendants had 
failed to comply with the conditions imposed by Judge Snow 
and Judge Conder, that the original judgment of Judge Snow 
had not been vacated and ordered that execution issue (Ap· 
pendix "G") • New counsel's 60 (b), URCP, motion (Appendix 
"H") to vacate the two year old judgment to Judge Snow 
(Appendix "B") the order of Judge Taylor (Appendix "G") was 
denied by Judge Taylor (Appendix "I") Those motions (except 
with respect to the order of Judge Taylor, Appendix "I") 
were all filed more than 3 months after the order or jud~ 
ment. 
Defendants' efforts to confuse the issues by assertions 
that Judge Taylor was confused, that interrogatories sub· 
mitted were burdensome, that the orders compelling discovery 
were confusing, that their attorney was grossly negligent, 
and that they should be permitted relief after expiration of 
the 3 month limit imposed by Rule 60(b), URCP, are without 
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Defendant's claim that they should be relieved of 
responsibility for the alleged omissions of their attorney 
are without merit, particulary since they elected to con-
tinue his services after judgment had been entered and 
conditionally vacated by reason of those alleged omissions. 
If the rules are to be enforced are to be unclogged, 
and cases are to be moves along in a reasonable manner, it 
is essential that the Court have available the most severe 
of sanctions to determine similar conduct by others. 
The order of Judge Taylor denying defendants' 60 (b), 
URCP, motion to vacate judgment and orders should be denied, 
particularly since similar motions had been made and ruled 
upon by the same and other judges, those orders had not 
been appealed and were res judicata. 
Dated the~- day of July, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
a:i~~&-e~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone 486-9636 
Attorney for plaintiff -
respondent 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing 
to be hand-delivered the /3 day of July, 1979 • to B~y~~ 
E. Roe, attorney for appella&ts 340 East Fourth hout -:za 
Lake City, Utah 84111. /,j_) ;/ fl /() . 
~~'-- J- ~ 
' Ron~ld C. Barker 
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